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ESSAYS
APPELLATE DELAY AS A CATALYST FOR CHANGE IN
VIRGINIA
Julie M. Carpenter*
The mischief was felt throughout the breadth of the land, in the
disrepair and ruin of suitors and their families, in the disrepute
drawn upon the administration of justice, and in the derogation
from the frame of the Commonwealth herself.
-Justice Baldwin, 1849'
A Virginia citizen injured in an automobile accident in 1988 who
is denied compensation through trial court error will wait an aver-
age of 1,165 days (3.2 years) after trial for the Supreme Court of
Virginia to rectify the matter.2 Of course, that wait is only for the
seventeen percent of cases that the supreme court elects to review,3
since Virginia is one of the only states that grants no right of ap-
peal in most civil and criminal cases. 4 By way of limited contrast, a
* Associate, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., 1983, College of William and Mary;
J.D., 1987, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1. Sharpe v. Robertson, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 518, 602-03 (1849).
2. Report on Case Disposition Time from Kathy L. Mays, Director of Judicial Planning,
Supreme Court of Virginia, to Mary Devine, Staff Attorney, Division of Legislative Services
(Dec. 18, 1987) [hereinafter Report on Case Disposition]. A copy of the Report on Case
Disposition is available in the office of the University of Richmond Law Review.
3. VIRGINIA STATE OF THE JuDiciARY REPORT 30 (1987). [hereinafter JUDICIARY REPORT].
Of 782 petitions disposed of, the court granted 131 appeals. Id.
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670 (Repl. Vol. 1984). This section provides that a party may
petition the supreme court for an appeal if he believes himself aggrieved by a judgment
concerning title to property, condemnation, probate of a will, appointment of a personal
representative or the like, a mill, road, ferry, wharf or landing, the right of a governmental
body to levy taxes, the construction of a law imposing taxes; or by the order of a court
refusing a writ of quo warranto; or by a final judgment in any other civil case. A party may
also petition in certain interlocutory situations. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
civil appeal in the North Carolina Supreme Court averages be-
tween 241 days and 257 days.5 The Kentucky Supreme Court aver-
ages eight and one-half to eleven months from the trial court deci-
sion to the appellate court decision, and the Kentucky Court of
Appeals averages fourteen months for the same process.' However,
if the Virginia citizen's case is a workers' compensation claim, a
domestic relations case, or an administrative agency case, that citi-
zen will wait only eight to eleven months for an answer from the
Virginia Court of Appeals.7
These observations lead to a dilemma that can best be encapsu-
lated in two familiar, but competing adages: "Justice delayed is
justice denied" and "Justice rushed is justice ruined." The tension
between the litigants' need for a prompt resolution of the contro-
versy and the courts' need for careful consideration has been com-
plicated by the increasingly litigious nature of society. As a result,
the problems of appellate delay are of increasing concern in nearly
all states.
While the review process takes time, "delay" is used in this Es-
say to mean time not necessary to this process. A litigant may be-
lieve that any time not spent on his or her case means delay. Chief
Justice Carrico, however, defines delay as "any elapsed time be-
yond what is reasonably necessary to process and to conclude a
particular case."8
Of course, what is "reasonably necessary" is precisely the ques-
tion. While there is no definitive answer, some comparisons of av-
erage appeal times may be useful. The elapsed time from a federal
district court decision in the Fourth Circuit to a decision by the
court of appeals is generally less than one year.9 The National Ap-
pellate Judges' Conference proposes that 300 days should be the
standard period of time between the filing of an appeal and the
The only right to an appeal in civil cases is found in VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.05 (Repl.
Vol. 1988), which provides an appeal of right to the court of appeals in cases from an admin-
istrative agency, the industrial commission, or in a domestic relations case. Id. There is no
right of appeal in criminal cases except where a sentence of death is imposed. See id. § 17-
110.1.
5. Report on Case Disposition, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Carrico, 1988 State of the Judiciary Message, JUDIcIARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 9-
10.
9. Smith, Appellate Capacity in Virginia, VA. B.A.J. 2-3 (Fall 1987).
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issuance of a decision. 10 The American Bar Association suggests
that the average time between argument and decision should not
exceed sixty days for courts sitting in panels of more than three
judges, and that the maximum time, except in cases of extraordi-
nary complexity, should not exceed ninety days."' As noted earlier,
North Carolina and Kentucky courts render decisions in slightly
over a year. While comparisons are difficult in light of Virginia's
unique system, the bare fact that justice takes longer in Virginia
than in many other systems cannot be ignored.
Of course, this lengthy delay is only a factor in those cases that
are reviewed. In Virginia, approximately eight-three percent of pe-
titions for appeal are denied with the effect that the lower court
judgments stand. The policy of the supreme court is to grant the
petition for appeal "when any doubt exists as to the propriety of
the decision."' 2 Thus, a denial of a petition acts as a summary af-
firmation on the merits, however, the sheer numbers of cases dis-
posed of by the court suggests that the "merits" standard is illu-
sory.'3 Thus, while Virginians whose petitions are denied may get
their answer relatively quickly, they may often have been denied
effective review for error.
To remedy both the problems of delay and the lack of appellate
review, Senator Wiley F. Mitchell, Jr. introduced legislation in the
Virginia Senate which would expand the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals' jurisdiction to include all civil cases. This would transfer the
bulk of appellate jurisdiction to that court. In addition, the propo-
sal would grant both civil and criminal litigants the right to an
appeal.' 4 This Essay considers the likely effects of that bill and
offers proposals to counteract several anticipated problems. In ad-
dition, this Essay considers alternatives to the proposed bill.
It seems clear that appellate justice is delayed in Virginia.
Whether justice is denied as a result raises the question of the ef-
fects of delay. Some delay can generate systemic benefits. The
knowledge of both parties to a civil suit that an appellate decision
10. Id.
11. ABA Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE CouRTs § 3.52(b)(4) and commentary (1977) [hereinafter STANDARDS].
12. McCue v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 870, 1008, 49 S.E. 623, 632 (1905); see also Saun-
ders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 204 S.E.2d 421 (1971).
13. See Lilly & Scalia, Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?, 57 VA. L. REv. 3, 13-16
(1971) [hereinafter Lilly & Scalia].
14. S. 5, Va. General Assembly, 1988 Sess. (Jan. 13, 1988).
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may be over three years in the making could be an incentive to a
private settlement of the dispute. This benefit, however, inures
only when both parties to the dispute are equally situated or when
both parties can equally afford the delay. If the parties are not on
substantially equal footing, the delay puts the party who can afford
to wait in a superior bargaining position. Even if it is clear that one
party will prevail on appeal, that party may be inclined to settle
for less than the "just" amount because of the immediate need for
funds. Even when parties can equally afford the delay, the lengthy
time can be used for purposes of harassment.
Beyond the harm to individual litigants, extensive delay in
resolving disputes adversely impacts upon the citizenry as a whole.
The length of delay and the comparatively small opportunity for a
full appellate review has led to an erosion of trust and confidence
in the judicial system. To the extent that our constitutional system
rests on societal acceptance of judicial authority rather than on po-
lice enforcement of court decisions, public confidence is crucial to a
viable justice system.
Further, in a common law tradition such as Virginia's, timely
analysis of the law is essential to consistent and orderly human
relations. Delay of three or four years in appellate court interpreta-
tion of new rules, statutes, or principles deprives the bar, the trial
judges, the parties and the public of guidance and allows them to
proceed without direction. Uncertainty in the law causes increased
litigation at the trial court level and permits trial courts to reach
inconsistent results that take years to resolve. This delay also de-
tracts from the court's limited ability to make or shape public pol-
icy and from its role as constitutional tailor to the General
Assembly.
Another problem caused by delay relates to the economic health
of the Commonwealth. Delays in specific civil cases encumber or
even halt the operations of the businesses involved until the dis-
pute is resolved. In addition, many companies that might do busi-
ness in Virginia may be deterred by the obvious financial risk of
any potential legal dispute given Virginia's slow appellate process.
Certainly judicial factors influence business decisions regarding the
expansion or contraction of business activities within the
Commonwealth.
Finally, the length of delay may impede the progress of the law
itself. Litigants whose lawyers have developed a novel argument or
[Vol. 23:141
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a new distinction are discouraged from pursuing an appeal in the
face of a three and one-half year wait. Because novel arguments
rarely assure predictable outcomes, the supreme court may be de-
prived of the very type of case that results in a new development
in the law. Therefore, a lengthy appellate delay impinges upon in-
dividual litigants, adversely affects the public's perception of jus-
tice, impedes economic strength and growth, and retards the devel-
opment of a system of laws that encompasses modern complexities.
While there may be some perceived beneficial effects, it seems
plain that unreasonable delay in appellate justice is harmful.
Before considering solutions to the problem of backlog and ap-
pellate delay, its causes will be examined. The most obvious cause
is the steadily increasing population in Virginia, and the resulting
growth in litigation.15 Virginia's population increased by forty-four
percent between 1960 and 1985 and the number of lawsuits filed in
Virginia has increased from 423 in 1960 to 1,043 in 1985.16 More-
over, the supreme court's backlog of cases has increased from be-
tween seventy-five and 100 in 1960 to 1,443 in 1987.' In addition
to the numbers of citizens utilizing the legal system, the increasing
complexity of governmental regulation leads to increased litigation.
Much of the delay in the Supreme Court of Virginia is the result
of a backlog that has grown over the past decade. The Virginia
General Assembly, however, was alerted long ago of the need for an
intermediate appellate court to handle the growing caseload.18 The
legislature could have avoided some of the backlog by choosing to
act when it first became aware of this need.
Delay in the supreme court and in the court of appeals is also
engendered in part by the system of petitions and appeals. Because
the function of the petition is to demonstrate error that will merit
an appeal, the content of the petition for appeal and of the brief
on appeal are not likely to differ substantially. Indeed, the rule
governing petitions provides that "It]he form and contents of the
petition for appeal shall conform in all respects to the require-
ments of the opening brief of appellant."'19 Yet this process re-
15. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, series p-25, No. 970
(1985); Lilly & Scalia, supra note 13, at 10-11.
16. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT
1985, at 184 (1985) [hereinafter STATE COURT STATISTICS]; Lilly & Scalia, supra note 13, at 7.
17. See JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 29; Lilly & Scalia, supra note 13, at 11.
18. See Lilly & Scalia, supra note 13, at 3-4.
19. VA. S. CT. R 5 :17 (c).
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quires that an aggrieved party in a civil action over which the su-
preme court has jurisdiction must file a petition for appeal not
more than three months after entry of the final order. The oppo-
nent then has twenty-one days to file a brief in opposition." The
appellant is entitled to oral argument or may waive it and instead
submit a reply brief. The panel considers whether the petitioner
has shown harmful error that warrants an appeal. If harmful error
is demonstrated, the appellant must then file an opening brief
within forty days of the certification of appeal and the process of
responding and arguing repeats itself.2 This redundancy wastes
not only time in the progress of the appeal but also money, be-
cause attorney hours and printing costs for petitions and briefs
mount quickly. Surely the same document could inform the court
of error as well as identify it.
Finally, the addition of the Virginia Court of Appeals to the Vir-
ginia system has arguably affected the process. Although tempora-
rily relieving the supreme court some of the pressures of its
caseload,22 the court of appeals expands appellate capacity and
therefore increases the number of cases appealed.23 Significantly,
although supreme court filings fell by 872 in 1985, they increased
again in 1986 by 189, and in 1987 by another 211.24
Concern about the problem of delay and lack of review led Sena-
tor Wiley F. Mitchell, Jr. to introduce Senate Bill 5 in the 1988
session of the Virginia General Assembly. The bill proposes to ex-
pand the jurisdiction of the court of appeals to include most civil
cases and to grant an appeal of right to criminal and civil litigants.
Specifically, the original bill provided that the court of appeals
would have jurisdiction over:
(i) any final conviction in a circuit court of a traffic infraction or a
crime, except where a sentence of death has been imposed, (ii) any
final decision of a circuit court on an application for a concealed
weapons permit pursuant to subsection D of § 18.2-308, (iii) any fi-
20. Id. at 5:17, 5:18. A petition is limited to 35 typed pages while a brief may contain up
to 50. Id. at 5:26. The rules governing the appeals process suggest no difference in content.
21. Id. at 5:26 to 5:35.
22. The total number of supreme court petitions filed fell from 1,915 in 1984 to 1,043 in
1985. The court of appeals opened its doors in 1985. Between 1985 and 1986, the supreme
court was able to reduce its backlog from 1,270 cases to 825 cases. JUDIcIARY REPORT, supra
note 3, at 29.
23. Flango & Blair, Creating an Intermediate Appellate Court: Does it Reduce the
Caseload of a State's Highest Court?, 64 JUDICATURE 74 (1980).
24. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 30.
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nal decision of a circuit court in a civil case, (iv) any final decision
of the Industrial Commission and (v) interlocutory orders or de-
crees, granting or denying an injunction in any case which would fall
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. 5
Additionally, the original bill deleted procedures for petitions in
the court of appeals since the right to appeal dispenses with the
need for petitions. It also left intact the provision that the decision
of the court of appeals should be final in those cases specified in
section 17-116.07 of the Code of Virginia."
After Senator Mitchell introduced this bill it was referred to the
Senate Committee for Courts of Justice. It was reported out of
that committee by a vote of nine to six in favor of the bill.27 The
bill was then sent to the Senate Committee on Finance for fiscal
consideration. After a hearing, the Committee on Finance first
voted to pass indefinitely. A week later the vote was reconsidered
and the bill was carried over to the 1989 session in amended
form.28 The Finance Committee proposed a substitute bill which
provided for three extra judges on the court of appeals. It further
deleted section 17-116.07(3) of the Code of Virginia, which pro-
vides that decisions of the court of appeals on issues of domestic
law should be final.29 The amended bill is still active and on the
docket for the 1989 General Assembly to consider.
As an effort to allay the problems caused by delay and backlog
in the supreme court, and to assure judicial review of all cases, the
proposed bill is surely a progressive step. The bill would bring Vir-
25. S. 5, Va. General Assembly, 1988 Sess. (Jan. 13, 1988) (emphasis added). On January
18, 1988, Senator Mitchell introduced Senate Bill 69 to accompany Senate Bill 5, which
would anend other relevant sections of the Code of Virginia to reflect the change in
jurisdiction.
26. Those decisions of the court of appeals which are final and without appeal to the
supreme court are: traffic infractions, misdemeanor convictions in which no incarceration is
imposed, cases from administrative agencies or the Industrial Commission, domestic rela-
tions cases, cases appealed by the Commonwealth pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-398, -
401 (Repl. Vol. 1988), and cases involving involuntary treatment of prisoners. Id. § 17-
166.07(A)(1)-(5). However, subsection B of § 17-166.07 provides for supreme court review of
all these cases, except appeals pursuant to § 19.2-398, if they involve a substantial constitu-
tional question or a matter of significant precedential value. Id. § 17-166.07(B).
27. Telephone interview with Senator Wiley F. Mitchell, Jr. (July 6, 1988).
28. Id.
29. S. 5, Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute, Va. General Assembly, 1988 Sess.
(Feb. 23, 1988) On February 24, 1988, the Finance Committee also submitted a substitute
Senate Bill 69 to implement Senate Bill 5. Both versions of Senate Bill 69 involved primar-
ily technical changes.
1988]
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ginia in line with the appellate structure of most other states as
well as the American Bar Association's standards which suggest
that every appellate level court should have full jurisdiction.30 It
would also relieve the supreme court of its present error-correcting
function and allow it to choose to consider those cases necessary to
the development of the law. For any lawyer who has combed the
Virginia Reports vainly searching for a clear pronouncement of law
regarding a situation they know occurs frequently, the increased
opportunity for the supreme court to consider cases of public in-
terest and precedential value may be sufficient justification alone
for the bill. The bill would also help reduce delay because the su-
preme court's examination of petitions would be limited to
whether the legal issues merit comment, rather than whether the
record establishes error. A further strength of the bill is that it
preserves the finality of the decisions of the court of appeals in
appeals from decisions by administrative agencies, the industrial
commission and misdemeanor convictions. Most important, it as-
sures judicial review for every litigant who desires it.
Nevertheless, the potentially negative effects of the proposed bill
deserve serious consideration before such a drastic change in ap-
pellate structure occurs. The initial difficulty in predicting the ef-
fect of the bill stems from its two-fold nature. Not only does the
bill expand the appellate court's jurisdiction to review cases, but it
significantly increases the number of cases to be reviewed by pro-
viding for an appeal as a matter of right. The immediate effect of
this two-fold change is to shift the backlog of cases to the court of
appeals from the supreme court. The change from petition to ap-
peal as a matter of right will almost certainly encourage more fil-
ings. Even assuming no increase in filing occurs due to the appeal
by right or due to the transfer, the bill will increase the court of
appeals' caseload by approximately one-third. 1 While the bill pro-
poses to expand the court of appeals' size by nearly one-third, it is
fallacious to assume that three new judges will simply pick up the
extra work. Again, assuming the court's workload will expand by
only one-third, each judge will still have to read and review an in-
30. ABA Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, STANDARDS RELATING TO
COURT ORGANIZATION § 1.13 (1974).
31. In 1986, 1,536 cases were filed in the court of appeals; in 1987 there were 1,625. In
1986, 520 civil appeals were filed in the supreme court, while 577 were filed in 1987. JUDICI-
ARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 29, 33. Thus, the transfer of the civil cases filed in those years
would increase the court of appeals' caseload by approximately one-third.
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creased number of opinions. Thus, some slowdown in the process
time of the court of appeals seems inevitable.
A more long-term effect is that the proposed bill effectively cre-
ates a two-tired appellate system that would regularly permit
double appeals. The evils of this kind of system have been dis-
cussed at length. Professors Lilly and Scalia (now Justice Scalia)
concluded that such a system "denies the substance of justice by
delaying it; and it often destroys the appearance of justice by pro-
viding the spectacle of a judgment reversed and then reinstated."32
A litigant who faces a double appeal may face a longer delay than
the three and one-half year wait now necessary, and he or she will
certainly face additional costs. The judicial system itself must also
bear increased costs. In terms of delay, the provision authorizing
an appeal as a matter of right will have a dual effect. The actual
court time spent on the appeal of a case that would formerly have
been by petition will not differ significantly. In considering
whether to grant a criminal petition, in which there is no appeal by
right, the court of appeals currently considers the petition, any pe-
tition in opposition, the record and a brief oral argument. In con-
sidering the appeal by right in a domestic relations case, the court
considers the briefs, the record, and a slightly longer oral argu-
ment. Those criminal decisions which are plainly correct and in-
volve no precedential issue are denied an appeal with a short or-
der. Those domestic relations cases which are plainly correct and
involve no precedential issue are generally affirmed with a short
order. Thus, the proposed bill would allow the court to confine
each case to one hearing and one set of documents and avoid the
redundancy of petitions and briefs as well as the wasted time be-
tween granting the petition and hearing oral argument on the
appeal.
In addition, an appeal as a matter of right is likely to dramati-
cally increase in the number of cases filed. In 1984, the number of
petitions for appeal in civil cases filed in Virginia totalled 682.11
When the court of appeals opened its doors in 1985, the total civil
filings increased to 984.84 While some of this increase is due to per-
ceived increased appellate capacity, it seems clear that part of it
was in response to the new right to appeal domestic relations, in-
dustrial commission, and administrative agency decisions. Addi-
32. Lilly & Scalia, supra note 13, at 46.
33. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 30.
34. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 30, 32. Five hundred and nine cases were filed
with the supreme court while 475 were filed with the court of appeals.
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tionally, the record of the court of appeals in deciding civil cases in
an average of 285 days from the filing of opening briefs may en-
courage litigants who might not have appealed to the supreme
court in view of its backlog.3"
If, in spite of the drawbacks, the legislature determines that a
two-tiered system will remedy more problems than it creates, the
bill should be amended to lessen some of its negative effects. First,
to avoid a simple shifting of the backlog, the legislature should
consider adding more than three judges to the court of appeals. In
a study using four methods to project the impact of Senate Bill 5
on the court of appeals, the supreme court administrative staff
concluded that at least three and as many as ten new judges would
be required.36 The Director of Judicial Planning did not recom-
mend one method over another as being more reliable or having
greater predictability, but did note that method three was the only
one that took into account both the variables of transfer of juris-
diction and appeal by right.3 7 Method three suggests adding six
judges. Whether the decision to add three judges was reached by a
careful consideration of the problems created by Senate Bill 5, by
the simple determination that one-third more judges could handle
one-third more cases, or by the political expediency inherent in the
least expensive option, it seems certain that this provision will be
significant to the issue of delay. Realistically, the addition of only
three judges appears insufficient to handle the added caseload.
Adding more judges, however, may actually hamper the ability
of the court to perform.3 A court faced with expanded jurisdiction
faces a Hobson's choice. Either a court remains relatively small
and maintains its collegiality and uniformity while each judge han-
dles more cases and the backlog grows, or it expands so that the
level of work for each judge remains relatively stable, but the man-
ageability of the group as a unit is sacrificed. Because most deci-
sions in the court of appeals are made by panels composed of three
judges, the effect of the increased number would not impact on the
process of conferencing most cases. In theory, an additional three
35. Report on Case Disposition, supra note 2.
36. ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF, SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, IMPACT OF SENATE BILL #5 ON
THE COURT OF APPEALS (1988). A copy of this Report is available in the office of the Univer-
sity of Richmond Law Review.
37. Telephone interview with Kathy L. Mays, Director of Judicial Planning, Supreme
Court of Virginia (July 19, 1988).
38. ABA Section of Judicial Administration, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPEL-
LATE COURTS 53-55 (1961).
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or six judges would simply create one or two more judicial panels.
The real impact would be that each judge would have to review an
increased number of opinions since each opinion is circulated first
to the panel and then to the entire court. The probable effect
would be a more cursory review of those cases in which a judge did
not participate, and, consequently, a heavier reliance on the indi-
vidual panels. The impact would also be felt in en banc sessions.
While it is difficult for ten judges to confer, persuade, and reason
in the limited time available at sessions, it would be nearly impos-
sible for sixteen to reach any sort of a consensus. The solution to
the problem in some states has been to divide the court into per-
manent divisions with divisional conflicts being resolved by the
state supreme court.39
To lessen the likelihood of double appeals, the legislature should
strengthen the terminal quality of the court of appeals' decisions.
This can be achieved without infringing on the supremacy of the
supreme court. Current law provides, and the proposed bill retains
the provision that notwithstanding the statutory provision for the
finality of a court of appeals' decision,
in any case... in which the supreme court determines on a petition
for review that the decision of the court of appeals involves a sub-
stantial constitutional question as a determinative issue or matters
of significant precedential value, review may be had in the supreme
court in accordance with the provisions of [section] 17-116.08. 40
Further, under the current statute as well as the proposed statute,
the supreme court may, on its own motion, certify a case for its
own review and effectively remove it from the court of appeals
before review by that court.41 These two provisions ensure the
supremacy of the supreme court in every case worthy of comment
in spite of provisions for finality in the court of appeals. Thus, a
provision stating that the court of appeals' decision is final except
39. For example, the 34 judges on the Illinois Appellate Court sit in five districts. Simi-
larly, the 16 members of the Washington Court of Appeals sit in three divisions. ROPER,
ELSENCE & FLANGO, 1984 STATE APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION GUIDE FOR STATISTICAL RE-
PORTING, 6, 9, table 1. [hereinafter JURISDICTION GUIDE].
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.07(B) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
41. Id. § 17-116.06. The section provides that the supreme court may certify a case when
it determines that "[t]he case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation
from normal appellate practice and to require prompt decision in the Supreme Court" Id. §
17.-116.06(B)(1), or that the docket of the court of appeals requires a transfer of jurisdiction
to serve the expeditious administration of justice. Id. § 17-116.06(B)(2).
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in the above circumstances would not contravene valid supremacy,
but would prevent double-level error-correction. The original bill
provided that decisions of the court in domestic relations cases
would be final. That provision should be reinserted and the bill
should further provide that decisions in all civil cases will be final,
subject to section 17-116.07 of the Code of Virginia.
Finally, the legislature could avoid the problems of the double
appeal as well as the inevitable problems of delay created by a
bulk transfer of jurisdiction by providing an appeal by right in civil
cases directly to the supreme court and empowering the supreme
court to screen those cases and to transfer to the court of appeals
any cases involving simple error-correction while retaining those
that require some policy analysis. The effect of this procedure
would be three-fold. First, the appeal by right would be retained.
Second, the transfer of jurisdiction would be less burdensome on
the court of appeals because they would have fewer cases. Third,
the likelihood of a double appeal is virtually nonexistent because
the supreme court would presumably send to the court of appeals
those cases about which it had little of substance to say.
If the General Assembly concludes that Senate Bill 5 is not the
answer to appellate delay and lack of review, it nonetheless must
take some action to remedy this critical situation. There are a
range of possible solutions which address the problems from both
the legislative and judicial level. Most of the following suggestions
are aimed at only one of the changes suggested in Senate Bill 5.
These changes would allow the problem of the backlog and delay
to be solved first, leaving the question of appeal as a matter of
right to be addressed at a later date.
The first possibility is rooted in Virginia history. In 1848, faced
with a backlog of eight or nine years of cases in the supreme court,
the General Assembly created a "Special Court of Appeals" to
"'[aid] in dispatching the business'" of the supreme court.42 This
legislative court grew out of earlier attempts to provide a substi-
tute court which could take cases that the members of the supreme
court could not hear due to a conflict of interest.4 3 The constitu-
tionality of this special court was challenged in Sharpe v. Robert-
42. Note, The Virginia Special Court of Appeals: Constitutional Relief for an
Overburdened Court, 8 WM. & MARY L. REv. 244, 254-55 (quoting SEN. Doc. No. 36, REPORT
OF THE REVISORS, Va. General Assembly, 1848-1849 Sess.).
43. See id. at 252.
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son.44 In dismissing the challenge, Justice Baldwin held, "[t]he
Special Court is a subordinate tribunal, as much so as any other
Superior Court which the legislative department may, in its discre-
tion, from time to time establish; and is as much bound to defer to
the authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals. ' '45
Perhaps in response to the constitutional challenge, the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1851 made the special court a constitutional
court which could be convened by legislative act.46 Through several
further changes, the constitutional provision finally came to au-
thorize the legislature to provide a special court of appeals
to try any cases on the docket of [the supreme court of appeals], in
respect to which a majority of the judges thereof may be so situated
as to make it improper for them to sit on the hearing of the same;
and also to try any cases on the said docket which cannot be other-
wise disposed of with convenient dispatch. '47
Three such courts were convened by legislative act between 1872
and 1928.48 The revision of the constitution in 1971 resulted in de-
letion of the special court provision.
Although the revised constitution no longer provides for the spe-
cial court of appeals, it still vests the legislature with the power to
create courts with appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the su-
preme court.49 The General Assembly exercised this power when it
created the 1848 court whose constitutionality was upheld in
Sharpe. It also exercised this power in creating the Virginia Court
of Appeals in 1984. Similarly, it could use this power to create a
temporary court which could, in a structure similar to that sug-
gested earlier, take cases the supreme court has screened and
passed on to them. This court would present no challenge to the
supremacy of the supreme court because it would derive its cases
from the supreme court, and its jurisdiction would be limited to
appellate review which the legislature is free to vest in any court 50
44. 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 518 (1849).
45. Id. at 608.
46. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 12 (1851).
47. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1869).
48. Act of Feb. 28, 1872, ch. 124, 1871-72 Va. Acts 98; Act of March 15, 1924, ch. 264,
1924 Va. Acts 391; Act of April 18, 1927, ch. 56, § 1, 1927 Va. Acts 148.
49. VA. CONST. art. IV § 1.
50. For a discussion of this constitutional supremacy, see Justice Baldwin's discussion in
Sharpe v. Robertson, 46 Va. at 603-10. The constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power
of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such other courts of origi-
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The particularly attractive aspect of this court is its imperma-
nence. The legislature could create and dissolve it when necessary
or allow it to expire by operation of law. The additional cost would
be minimal since the system would require few permanent arrange-
ments, and would incur costs only when operating.
In light of the figures that suggest that the supreme court's
backlog is not increasing but rather remaining constant,51 this tem-
porary solution may provide a means of solving the delay problem
quickly without introducing the unpredictable complications of the
appeal as a matter of right. Once both courts are functioning at
reasonable capacities without the burden of a crushing backlog, the
issue of appeal by right could be addressed in more detail with
more predictable results.
A less dramatic and probably less controversial means of solving
the delay problem before addressing appeal as a matter of right, is
to temporarily transfer civil jurisdiction to the court of appeals.
This temporary transfer would provide the supreme court an op-
portunity to update its caseload. While this would probably result
in a slowdown in the court of appeals, it would allow caseloads to
adjust. After the temporary transfer period expired, the legislature
could examine caseload figures and determine whether to continue
civil jurisdiction in the court of appeals and further consider the
issue of an appeal as a matter of right.
Another alternative in lieu of Senate Bill 5 is to add justices to
the supreme court. The Virginia Constitution authorizes a seven
member supreme court but provides that the General Assembly
may increase the size to no more than eleven justices.2 Although
additional justices would not necessarily result in a proportionately
increased case disposition, it would probably result in some in-
crease. In 1987, the justices of the supreme court issued about
twenty-one opinions apiece. In 1985, the figure was eighteen opin-
ions per justice, and only six states had a lower per judge output.5 3
This figure must be analyzed in light of the time the justices ex-
nal or appellate jurisdiction subordinate to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly
may from time to time establish." VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1. The constitution vests the su-
preme court with original jurisdiction in matters of mandamus, habeas corpus, and prohibi-
tion as well as judicial censure, retirement and removal. The General Assembly has the
power to determine the appellate and original jurisdiction of all the courts, subject to that
vested by the constitution. Id.
51. See JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
52. VA. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
53. STATE COURT STATISTICS, supra note 16, at 204, table 6.
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pend on the petition procedure which is unnecessary in most other
states. However, it illustrates the need for more justices and more
efficient judicial output. The size of the court would still be well
within the bounds of easy collegiality and manageability.5 4
Regardless of the legislature's decision regarding Senate Bill 5 or
any other measure, Virginia appellate courts have a responsibility
to seek ways to render efficient justice. The concern with bur-
geoning litigation and its impact on the appellate courts nation-
wide has spawned a variety of innovative judicial responses. Al-
though different courts may require different measures, internal
reform may yield dramatic results. What follows is a discussion of
measures adopted by other states. This discussion is not exhaus-
tive, but it is illustrative of judicial reforms undertaken by other
jurisdictions. While not every measure is appropriate or adaptable
to the Virginia system, the variety may serve to spark the Virginia
imagination to create a Virginia solution.
Currently in Virginia there are no suggested guidelines to en-
courage judges to promptly render decisions. In California, Alaska,
and Washington, a judge's paycheck is withheld if he or she fails to
meet deadlines for decisions.5 In several states, the state constitu-
tion establishes the time period within which an appeal must be
concluded. 6 Other states provide guidelines by statute, standard,
or court rule. Even if there is no "sanction" for failure to meet
the deadline, its mere existence establishes a standard by which a
particular judge's work can be objectively measured. Also, the sub-
tle motivation that stems from the printed word and from peer
expectations is effective in encouraging judicial efficiency. After ex-
amining guidelines in other states and adapting them as necessary
to cover Virginia appellate procedure, each court should establish a
reasonable timetable for issuing opinions and endeavor to follow it.
Trial courts often set settlement conferences as a matter of
course to encourage a settlement before the litigants and the state
incur the expense and time of a trial. At the appellate level, how-
ever, Virginia judges are not involved in the settlement process al-
though 242 petitions and appeals were settled or withdrawn from
54. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
55. JURISDICTION GUIDE, supra note 39, at 98-1012, table 17.
56. Those states include California, Georgia and Maryland. Id.
57. Those states are Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina and Washington. Id.; see also STANDARDS,
supra note 11, § 3.52(b)(4).
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both appellate courts in 1987.8 A number of appellate courts have
instituted settlement processes at the appellate level to encourage
settlement and lessen the appellate caseload. The basic framework
involves a meeting between appellate counsel and a mediator (usu-
ally a trial judge, a retired judge, or perhaps a staff attorney) to
discuss settlement options. The meeting is confidential so that if
no settlement occurs, the reviewing appellate judges will not know
the substance of the conference.59 Even if the parties do not settle,
the court may benefit from a narrowing of the issues to be argued
on appeal.6 0 Further, if an expedited appeal process is available,
the prehearing settlement conference can be a screening tool for
cases that are suitable for that process. A voluntary prehearing set-
tlement conference has been available in the Third District of the
California Court of Appeals since 1977.1 It has been credited with
doubling the percentage of cases dismissed in the first three years
of its existence; over half of the cases that went to conference set-
tled.2 Similarly, in a settlement conference experiment in Rhode
Island, twenty-six percent of the cases were settled while only four
percent of the control group which did not go to conference set-
tled. 3 Although the procedure requires an investment of judicial
system time and resources, even moderate success could recoup
those expenses.
Particularly if Senate Bill 5 becomes law, and the appeal of right
becomes effective, the Virginia Court of Appeals should establish a
procedure for expediting appeals. This "fast track" should be
available for cases suitable to a streamlined procedure. A variety of
features can characterize this process, but the most important is
the aspect of choice. The decision to pursue an expedited appeal is
a decision to forgo the full and extensive analysis of the traditional
appeal. Thus, this decision should be made by the litigant, not the
court. In general, an expedited appeal process seeks to reduce the
minimum permissible time for the briefing process. In return, the
court accelerates its handling and scheduling. The techniques to
accomplish this goal are several.
58. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 29, 33.
59. See Wasby, Appellate Delay: An Examination of Possible Remedies, 6 JUST. Sys. J.
325, 332 (1981).
60. Id.
61. Janes, Paras & Shapiro, The Appellate Settlement Conference Program in Sacra-
mento, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 110 (1981).
62. Washy, supra note 58, at 333.
63. Wiesberger, Appellate Caseload: Meeting the Challenge in Rhode Island, 16 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 527, 533 (1983).
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One possibility in a expedited appeal procedure is to limit or
eliminate either oral arguments or briefs. Members of the bar may
jealously guard both avenues of communication with the court, but
the redundancy that so often permeates this combination wastes
money and time. Currently, oral argument in both Virginia appel-
late courts is limited to thirty minutes per side.64 Limiting the ar-
guments to fifteen minutes, for example, would not make a signifi-
cant difference. Eliminating the arguments altogether, would not
only save travel time for the court of appeals which is geographi-
cally dispersed, and sitting time, it would also allow judges to be-
gin disposing of cases immediately following briefing without the
delay of scheduling oral arguments. 5 Several commentators, how-
ever, urge that elimination of all oral arguments is harmful because
it reduces visibility and public confidence in the personal attention
of the judges as well as deprives the court and counsel of the focus
that argument can provide."6 Additionally, even judges who are
convinced that most oral argument sheds little light on a case
would probably not say that no case is suitable for argument. A
procedure by which judges request that the parties waive oral ar-
gument in cases where it is not warranted would answer all these
concerns while allowing some time savings.
On the other hand, the expedited procedure could retain the oral
argument but reduce the significance of the brief. By limiting the
brief to a short document, the court could reduce the time neces-
sary for preparation as well as compress the time allowed for filing.
The oral argument should be scheduled promptly and enough time
should be allowed for the arguments to be sufficiently developed.1
7
The procedure would force attorneys and judges to be more depen-
dant on and thus better prepared for oral argument. In addition,
the redundancy of the process would be reduced.
64. VA. S. CT. R. 5A:28, 5:35.
65. Most federal courts have severely curtailed oral argument. See J. HOWARD, JR.,
COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY SYSTEM (1981).
66. Chapper & Hanson, Expedited Procedures for Appellate Courts: Evidence from Cali-
fornia's Third District Court of Appeal, 42 MD. L. REV. 696, 697 (1983).
67. The procedure adopted by the Third District includes the following features:
1. Brief limited to 10 double-spaced pages, exclusive of facts. No reply brief.
2. Appellant's brief due 20 days after scheduling order of expedited appeal.
3. Respondent's brief due within 20 days after appellant's deadline.
4. Oral argument set within 30 days of close of briefing with no time limit on
argument.
5. Opinion filed within 10 days after argument. Id. at 701-02.
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A technique which also emphasizes oral argument is one in
which briefs are filed and read by the judges who issue a short
memorandum outlining their tentative position to the attorneys.
This procedure has two benefits. First, the panel must have consid-
ered the case sufficiently before argument to take a tentative posi-
tion. Therefore, the judges will be familiar enough with the facts
and the law for precise, helpful questioning at oral argument. Sec-
ond, the attorneys will be able to tailor their arguments to address
the concerns expressed in the memorandum and correct miscon-
ceptions of law or fact expressed by the court. In addition, the
memorandum may function as a settlement tool. While it must be
clear that the memorandum is not binding on the judges, a party
whose precarious position is not embraced in the memorandum
may see the handwriting on the wall and forego the appeal or at-
tempt to settle the case prior to appellate decision.
Aside from measures regarding oral arguments and briefs, there
are several other means of expediting appeals. The prehearing con-
ference discussed earlier can serve to narrow the issues for an ex-
pedited appeal. A party who may be able to allege several grounds
of error may wish to confine review to only one or two primary
issues. Thus, the case could be placed on an expedited schedule.
Criminal appeals can also be expedited although settlement tech-
niques of course, would play no role. Provisional Order No. 16 in
Rhode Island provides a prebriefing conference based on a five-
page statement from each party. At the conference, the judge con-
siders both positions and may then order full briefing and argu-
ment, consolidation of appeals, remand for an evidentiary hearing
or entry of a necessary trial court order, or order one of the parties
to appear before the full court to show cause why the appeal
should not be summarily affirmed or reversed. Other techniques
may include summary disposition in appropriate cases, use of ab-
breviated records and use of a special expediting panel. The mate-
rial available on these procedures is voluminous. 9 Thus, both
courts can easily investigate many attractive options and imple-
ment them.
68. R.I. S. CT. R. 12 (Provisional Order No. 16).
69. E.g., OHIo A.P.R., 11.1 (allows appellate courts to operate on an accelerated calen-
dar); OR. A.P.R., 6.5 (allows parties to file an agreed upon narrative statement in lieu of the
transcript of lower court proceedings); UTAH C.A.R., 31 (upon agreement of the parties and
the court, the case is set for expedited decision without a written opinion within 45 to 60
days of the granting of the appeal).
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Although both appellate courts in Virginia are improving their
case management in terms of automation, there are case manage-
ment techniques that have been overlooked. Virginia appellate
courts should accept full responsibility for cases on the filing of a
notice of appeal. In particular, the appellate courts ought to be
concerned with and work towards the prompt filing of transcripts
because delay in that area is responsible for substantial appellate
delay, and attorneys are unable to address the problem. Currently,
the trial court may grant extensions for preparing and filing tran-
scripts as well as records. Because the record is for the appeal, the
trial courts have little incentive to ensure timeliness.
Problems also stem from the semi-autonomous status of the
court reporters. As private operators, they are not directly account-
able to either the trial court or the appellate court. The resulting
delays are out of reach of the appellate court. Both trial courts and
appellate courts should work together to monitor the production of
transcripts and provide incentives or sanctions to promote prompt-
ness by court reporters.7 0 Kentucky has taken the unusual step of
allowing untranscribed mechanical recordings that are made under
the supervision of the court to constitute part of the record.7 1 Pre-
sumably, this includes traditional audio taping as well as videotap-
ing. Besides eliminating the time now required to transcribe pro-
ceedings, this procedure potentially offers the reviewing court a
more complete picture of the lower court proceedings.
In conclusion, the efforts of the General Assembly to remedy the
problems of appellate delay and lack of review in Virginia are laud-
able. The legislature has created an intermediate court of appeals
that has functioned smoothly and has reduced the supreme court's
caseload. Unfortunately, the delay in creating the court of appeals
caused the already overburdened supreme court to develop an in-
tolerable backlog of cases which threatens to undermine efficiency
and public confidence in the Commonwealth's highest court. The
current situation is quite serious and calls for immediate action.
However, to drastically alter the structure of the court of appeals
after only three years to remedy the backlog problem may prevent
that court from reaching its full potential. The legislature should
70. See Washy, supra note 59, at 335. Robert Leflar suggests that court reporters should
be employed and supervised by the appellate court since their work is primarily for use in
the appellate process. R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS
17-18 (1976).
71. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. R. 72.04 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988).
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consider implementing interim measures designed to take care of
the supreme court's backlog. When that problem is solved, it
should then consider how best to implement the appeal as a matter
of right. In any case, both the Virginia Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of Virginia must examine the problem of judicial
delay and respond with innovative solutions because the amount of
trial court litigation and subsequent appeals shows no signs of
abating.
